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31 March 2017
Issue: 7740 / Categories: Case law , Law digest , In Court
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Financial services

Financial Conduct Authority v Macris [2017] UKSC 19, [2017] All ER (D) 153 (Mar)

The Supreme Court, in allowing an appeal by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), held that the respondent former international chief investment officer of JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, which had been fined by the Financial Conduct Authority after incurring losses of $6bn in respect of a trading portfolio, was not a third party for the purposes of s 393 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Accordingly, he had not been entitled to be notified in notices sent to the bank by the FCA, under s 393. The court held, among other things, that, on the true construction of s 393 of the Act, a person was “identified” in a notice, under that section, if he was identified by name or by a synonym for him, such as his office or job title.

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MOVERS & SHAKERS

Burgess Mee—Victoria Sterritt

Burgess Mee—Victoria Sterritt

Family law boutique expands London team with legal director hire

Ward Hadaway—Mike Gore

Ward Hadaway—Mike Gore

Firm enhances advisory capability with strategic risk specialist hire

Stewarts—Alexandra Lyons

Stewarts—Alexandra Lyons

Insurance and reinsurance specialist joins policyholder disputes practice as partner

NEWS
Some employment law controversies never disappear—they merely lie dormant
Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming legal practice, but its successful adoption depends as much on culture as technology
The fallout from Lord Mandelson’s appointment and dismissal as UK ambassador to Washington raises profound questions about constitutional governance, accountability and political appointments
Pastries may be in the firing line while kebabs escape scrutiny, but the reality is far more nuanced
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dillon highlights a central tension in modern public law: rights may be recognised without being fully realised
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