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Housing

28 February 2014
Issue: 7596 / Categories: Case law , Law digest , In Court
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R (on the application of Cornwall Council) v Secretary of State for Health and others [2014] EWCA Civ 12, [2014] All ER (D) 170 (Feb)

The scope of the power under s 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948 (where accommodation was given a wide meaning) was in fact wider than the power conferred by s 23C(4)(c) of the Children Act 1989. The power to provide accommodation was a far cry from a power to provide the full range of community care services (including personal care services). If Parliament had intended to confer a power of that scope via s 23C(4)(c) of the 1989 Act, it would have done so expressly.

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MOVERS & SHAKERS

FOIL—Bridget Tatham

FOIL—Bridget Tatham

Forum of Insurance Lawyers elects president for 2026

Gibson Dunn—Robbie Sinclair

Gibson Dunn—Robbie Sinclair

Partner joinslabour and employment practice in London

Muckle LLP—Ella Johnson

Muckle LLP—Ella Johnson

Real estate dispute resolution team welcomes newly qualified solicitor

NEWS
Cryptocurrency is reshaping financial remedy cases, warns Robert Webster of Maguire Family Law in NLJ this week. Digital assets—concealable, volatile and hard to trace—are fuelling suspicions of hidden wealth, yet Form E still lacks a section for crypto-disclosure
NLJ columnist Stephen Gold surveys a flurry of procedural reforms in his latest 'Civil way' column
Paper cyber-incident plans are useless once ransomware strikes, argues Jack Morris of Epiq in NLJ this week
In this week's NLJ, Robert Hargreaves and Lily Johnston of York St John University examine the Employment Rights Bill 2024–25, which abolishes the two-year qualifying period for unfair-dismissal claims
Writing in NLJ this week, Manvir Kaur Grewal of Corker Binning analyses the collapse of R v Óg Ó hAnnaidh, where a terrorism charge failed because prosecutors lacked statutory consent. The case, she argues, highlights how procedural safeguards—time limits, consent requirements and institutional checks—define lawful state power
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