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Leases—why a deed?

22 June 2018 / Mark Pawlowski
Issue: 7798 / Categories: Features , Property
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Mark Pawlowski asks whether we should abolish the formal requirement of a deed for leases

As is widely known, a lease must be made by deed in order to be valid at law: s 52(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. The current requirements are that (1) the document makes it clear on its face that it is intended to be a deed (2) it is validly executed as a deed by signature and attestation and (3) it is delivered as a deed: see, s 1(2) and (3) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.

Apart, therefore, from the document containing the formal description that it is a ‘deed’ (or expressing itself to be executed or signed as a deed), execution simply requires the individual’s signature (properly witnessed) together with, what has now become, constructive delivery of the document (ie, delivery by words) without any change in its physical control to mark the essential irreversibility of the transaction. Failure, however, to use the appropriate formal wording (ie ‘signed as a deed

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