Rethinking the FDR

• This article proposes a split FDR model: a two‑stage structure separating the judicial or evaluative indication from the negotiation phase.
• It invites the reader to consider whether, in a subset of cases, a carefully designed split process could better support participation, reduce cognitive overload, and ultimately improve settlement rates.

The financial dispute resolution (FDR) appointment remains one of the most successful procedural devices in financial remedy work. It is central to the Family Procedure Rules, routinely endorsed by senior judiciary, and consistently valued by practitioners for its ability to unlock settlement. Yet its traditional structure—a single, intensive day in which evaluation and negotiation must both take place—may be imperfectly matched to the realities of how people make decisions under stress.

The concept arose from a rare case in which a conventional FDR had to be adjourned mid‑day because of unexpected, distressing personal news affecting one party. When the matter returned shortly