Masood Ahmed analyses an arbitration case that highlights the tension between party autonomy & finality
- In the Gluck v Endzweig and another appeal, Dingemans LJ examined a clause permitting the tribunal to amend its award ‘at any time’, questioning whether it was compatible with the Arbitration Act 1996.
- The decision illustrates the limits of party autonomy and the importance of finality within the statutory framework of the Act.
Arbitration rests upon two fundamental principles, which at times may come into tension. The first is party autonomy: the freedom of the parties to structure their arbitral process as they see fit, including the freedom to select their arbitrators, define the scope of the reference, shape procedural rules, select the applicable laws, and determine the extent of review or correction of the award. Set against this is the principle of finality, which holds that an arbitral award is binding and conclusive on the parties, subject only to limited grounds of challenge or appeal as prescribed by law. Finality promotes legal certainty,
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