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Divorce: capacity to consent

23 March 2012
Issue: 7506 / Categories: Case law , Judicial line , In Court
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On a two years’ with consent divorce petition, what should happen procedurally if there is doubt...

On a two years’ with consent divorce petition, what should happen procedurally if there is doubt about the respondent’s capacity to consent to a decree? Can a litigation friend consent on the respondent’s behalf?

Consent must be given personally (see FPR rr 6.16(2) and 7.12 (4), (6)). If there are grounds to believe that a respondent lacks capacity to consent to a decree, an assessment of that capacity will be required. It does not necessarily follow that a person who lacks capacity to conduct proceedings also lacks capacity to consent to a decree.
 

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