ROAD TRAFFIC

The defendant’s car was stopped by the police. He then drove off in a manner that the police regarded as dangerous driving. No notice of intended prosecution was served on him before he was charged with dangerous driving.

The prosecution contended that the requirement of notice in the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (RTOA 1988), s 1(1)  did not apply by virtue of s 2(1), since there had been an “accident”. It was held that proof of an accident is not necessary to establish the offence of dangerous driving. The occurrence of an accident is relevant only to the procedural requirement of giving the defendant notice.

It is a question of law whether or not particular facts did or did not amount to an accident and so this issue is for the decision of the judge (not the jury) where the case is being tried in the crown court. 

The burden of proof, to the criminal standard, is on the prosecution to establish that an accident occurred. The word “accident” in s 2(1) has to be given a common sense meaning and is not restricted to untoward or unintended consequences having an adverse physical effect.

In this case, there was evidence to show physical contact between a police officer and the defendant’s car, and the circumstances would have been sufficiently memorable for it to be unnecessary to draw them to the defendant’s attention by serving a notice of intended prosecution—which is the underlying reason why a notice is not required where there has been an accident—and so the judge was entitled to conclude that the prosecution were not required to serve a notice under s 1.