Margaret Hatwood continues her examination of the increasing trend of parties asking for consent orders to be set aside
In Pt I of this two-part series, I looked at recent developments in the area of setting aside financial consent orders dealing with non-disclosure and fraud (see “Setting aside”, NLJ, 1 March 2013, p 229).
Part II covers situations involving new or supervening circumstances dealing with changes in asset values, death and remarriage.
Back to basics
Orders can, of course, be set aside where the whole factual basis on which the order was made has disappeared. In Barder v Caluori [1988] AC 20, [1987] 2 All ER 440 a consent order was made under which H was ordered to transfer his interest in the family matrimonial home to the wife. One of the primary reasons for this order was the wife had care of the children. Tragically, the wife killed the children and herself. On appeal to the House of Lords, the issue was whether leave to appeal
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