Taylor Wessing has been ordered to disclose information it held about parties involved in litigation, in a landmark Court of Appeal decision on legal professional privilege under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998).
In Dawson-Damer vs Taylor Wessing [2017] EWCA Civ 74, the claimant and her adult children were beneficiaries of a Bahamian trust, known as the Glenfinnan Settlement. She brought proceedings in the Bahamas against the trustee, who was advised by Taylor Wessing, and served the firm with a subject access request (SAR) under DPA 1998 since it held personal data relating to all three claimants.
Taylor Wessing refused on three grounds: the documents would not be disclosable under Bahamian law and were protected by privilege under English law; disproportionate effort on their part would be required to inspect the documents; and the purpose of the SAR was to obtain disclosure for the sake of litigation.
The Court of Appeal rejected all three arguments. It held that Bahamian law did not apply; that solicitors’ firms are not exempt from the scope of the DPA; that there was no evidence that disclosure would require disproportionate effort; and that the purpose of the SAR was of no consequence.
Ziva Robertson, partner at McDermott, Will & Emery, who acted for Dawson-Damer, said: “In the age of transparency, this important decision affirms everyone’s right to access and protect their personal information held by others.” Robertson said the decision reverses the previous position regarding subjects’ rights to personal data in the context of litigation.
