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Malicious falsehood requires hurt to pocket as well as feelings

14 June 2024
Categories: Legal News , In Court , Libel
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A claimant cannot recover damages for injury to feelings caused by a falsehood if they do not also suffer financial loss, the Supreme Court has held

George v Cannell and anor [2024] UKSC 19, [2024] All ER (D) 39 (Jun), handed down this week, concerned a claim by Fiona George, who was a recruitment consultant for an agency owned and operated by Linda Cannell, and who moved to a different agency. Cannell spoke to one of George’s clients and sent an email to her new employer alleging she was acting in breach of restrictions in her contract. George sued for libel, slander and malicious falsehood.

The High Court found the statements were false and malicious but did not cause any financial loss as George was able to refute them by showing her new boss a copy of her old contract. It dismissed the claim on the basis financial loss must be shown for a claim to succeed.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding it was sufficient under s 3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 to show the false statements were likely to cause financial loss, even if no actual loss occurred. Cannell appealed. The Supreme Court allowed Cannell’s appeal, on a 3–2 majority.

The Supreme Court unanimously held s 3(1) allows a claimant to demonstrate malicious falsehood where a falsehood is likely to cause financial loss―even if it does not. However, it also held a claimant can only recover damages for financial loss actually suffered. As no financial loss occurred, the claimant was entitled only to nominal damages. Lords Hamblen and Burrows dissented on this issue.

Jon Oakley, partner and specialist reputation lawyer at Simkins, said: ‘The claimant in this case believed that she was likely to suffer financial harm as a result of statements that had been made about her.

‘Although the court has decided the case in a certain way, I think that generally speaking, most people would agree that the law ought to provide a suitable remedy for anyone who finds themselves likely to suffer reputational harm as a result of any false and malicious statements that have been made about them. That is precisely why the law developed in the way that it had up to this point.

‘The court should try to strike a fair balance between competing rights and sometimes that isn’t easy on the facts.’

Categories: Legal News , In Court , Libel
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