Linda Monaci & Flora Wood examine the approach to applying malingering diagnostic criteria in cases involving head injury
The introduction of the concept of “fundamental dishonesty” to the defendant’s armoury in personal injury cases raises the stakes for litigants. If exposed, a claimant risks having their QOCS protection taken away or their entire claim struck out if the trial judge finds that they have been fundamentally dishonest in relation to “any aspect of the claim”. This article explores some of the methods used to identify malingering neurocognitive dysfunction (MND) to assist lawyers in deciding whether, perhaps, there are grounds to go as far as to plead fundamental dishonesty in the discrete area of brain injury.
Case law
The case law on the application and definition of fundamental dishonesty is still at a fledgling stage but was neatly summed up by Freedman J when considering CPR 44.16 in the case of Zurich Insurance v Bain (unreported, 4 June 2015): “What does fundamentally dishonest mean? It does not, in my judgment, cover situations where there is simply
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