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19 January 2018 / Stewart Duffy
Issue: 7777 / Categories: Features , Data protection , Criminal
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Data, disclosure & de-identification

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Will proposed offences in the Data Protection Bill make criminals of us all? Stewart Duffy investigates

  • De-identified data may subsequently be re-identified, often through context.
  • Clause 162, Data Protection Bill makes re-identification a criminal offence.
  • Defences may centre on the ‘purpose’ of the re-identification or the ‘reasonable beliefs’ of the accused.

De-identification of personal data is an important and widely used strategy deployed to mitigate the risk of unauthorised disclosure or access. The techniques that are deployed are varied. They do not necessarily render the data ‘anonymous’ as defined by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). That is often not their intention. Deliberate, and sometimes technically sophisticated, efforts to subvert those security measures are a legitimate cause for concern. There can be little principled objection to outlawing such steps by individuals who have no legitimate reason to possess the de-identified data, less still ‘re-identify’ it.

The criminalisation of ‘re-identification’ proposed in cl 162 of the Data Protection Bill is not an entirely novel innovation. Such a measure has been under active consideration

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MOVERS & SHAKERS

Thackray Williams—Lucy Zhu

Thackray Williams—Lucy Zhu

Dual-qualified partner joins as head of commercial property department

Morgan Lewis—David A. McManus

Morgan Lewis—David A. McManus

Firm announces appointment of next chair

Burges Salmon—Rebecca Wilsker

Burges Salmon—Rebecca Wilsker

Director joins corporate team from the US

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When an ex-couple is deciding who gets what in the divorce or civil partnership dissolution, when is it appropriate for a third party to intervene? David Burrows, NLJ columnist and solicitor advocate, considers this thorny issue in this week’s NLJ
NLJ's latest Charities Appeals Supplement has been published in this week’s issue
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