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The human touch

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Constructive dismissal upholds the law of contract, but with a human touch, says Tom Walker

  • The contractual nature of constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is all about contract law. It serves as a tonic to us employment lawyers. We are so used to our questions of fairness, reasonable investigation and legitimate aims that now and then it is good for us to adjust our minds to the pure law of contract. For example, it is all too easy to assume that a constructive dismissal is an unfair dismissal and confuse the two concepts. Perhaps the best reminder of the difference is the case of Farrant v Woodroffe School (1997) EAT/1117/96, [1998] IRLR 176.

A technician at a school was asked to teach another subject where there was under-staffing. He refused. The headteacher, mistakenly believing that he had a contractual right to impose the change, consulted with the technician and then implemented the decision. Mr Farrant resigned. There was a constructive dismissal in that there was no contractual right to make such a

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