CORONER—JURISDICTION—INQUEST

R (on the application of Paul and others) v Deputy Coroner of the Queen’s Household and Assistant Deputy Coroner for Surrey; R (on the application of Al Fayed) v Deputy Coroner of the Queen’s Household and Assistant Deputy Coroner for Surrey [2007] EWHC 408 (Admin), [2007] All ER (D) 31 (Mar)

Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court)

Smith LJ, Collins and Silber JJ

2 March 2007

The mandatory provisions of the Coroners Act 1988 (CA 1988), s 8(3) apply to the circumstances of deaths such as those of Princess Diana and Dodi Al Fayed as there is a real likelihood that others in the public eye might be chased by the paparazzi and exposed to risks, as might other members of the public.

Richard Keen QC, Thomas De la Mare and Victoria Windle (instructed by Stuart Benson & Co) for the driver’s parents.
Michael Beloff QC, Thomas De la Mare and Victoria Windle (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the driver’s employers.
Michael Mansfield QC, Henrietta Hill and Navtej Singh Ahluwalia (instructed by Lewis Silkin) for Mohammed Al Fayed.
Ian Burnett QC and Jonathan Hough (instructed by Michael Burgess) for Lady Butler-Sloss.
Edmund Lawson QC (instructed by Naz Saleh) for the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis.

The proceedings concerned the deaths of the princess and Al Fayed in August 1997. Their bodies were repatriated to Britain from France that day and taken to west London. The coroner for west London, Dr Burton, was informed of the presence of the bodies and was seized of jurisdiction to enquire into the deaths. When Burton was told that the princess would probably be buried in the grounds of Windsor Castle, he transferred jurisdiction over her death to the coroner of the Queen’s household, which he also was at the time.

In 2003, inquests were opened into the deaths. They were adjourned pending an investigation into the allegations of murder by Lord Stevens, of the Metropolitan Police. In August 2006 Lady Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, a retired judge, was appointed deputy coroner of the Queen’s household and assistant coroner for Surrey, to enable her to conduct both inquests.

Stevens’s report concluded there was no evidence to support the allegations of murder. It was published, with the defendant’s support.

In January 2007, the defendant convened a pre-inquest hearing, at which she determined that:
(i) the inquests should be held concurrently;
(ii) she had jurisdiction to act as the deputy coroner of the Queen’s household;
(iii) she would conduct the inquests without a jury; and
(iv) the inquest into Al Fayed would be transferred to her jurisdiction as coroner of the Queen’s household, pursuant to CA 1988, s 14.

The claimants applied to challenge decisions (ii)–(iv).

LADY JUSTICE SMITH (giving the judgment of the court):

CA 1988, s 14 provided:

“(1) If it appears to a coroner that, in the case of a body lying within his district, an inquest ought to be held into the death but it is expedient that the inquest should be held by some other coroner, he may request that coroner to assume jurisdiction to hold the inquest…”

The claimants submitted that the relevant provisions in CA 1988 showed that the power in s 14 did not enable transfers to be made either to or from the coroner of the Queen’s household.

Her Ladyship held that it was obviously desirable that the coroner of the Queen’s household should be able to make use of s 14. While it would be exceptional for it to be expedient for him to assume jurisdiction over a body lying elsewhere, the same could not be said of transfer out of his jurisdiction.

She concluded that, subject to the express exclusions, the provisions of CA 1988, which laid down the powers and obligations of coroners, applied equally to the coroner of the Queen’s household. CA 1988 was a consolidating act and that construction was in accordance with the predecessor statutes. Therefore the defendant had jurisdiction to make the transfer.

CA 1988, s 8 provided:

“(3) If it appears to a coroner, either before he proceeds to hold an inquest or in the course of an inquest begun without a jury, that there is reason to suspect…(d) that the death occurred in circumstances the continuance or possible recurrence of which is prejudicial to the health or safety of the public or any section of the public he shall proceed to summon a jury…”

Her Ladyship held that the circumstances leading up to the collision in this case were unusual and had additional features to those found in a more usual type of road accident. It was at least arguable that the fatal accident was caused or contributed to by the pursuing paparazzi. Indeed, it was not a condition for invoking s 8 that the circumstances which might possibly recur actually caused the deaths in question. There was a real likelihood of people in the public eye being pursued by the paparazzi in the future.

Not only was the safety of the person pursued potentially put at risk but there might be a risk to bystanders. Occurrences such as that were prejudicial to the safety of the public. It was possible that the danger could be prevented by legislation or other means. There were a number of ways in which the events could be preventable or controllable, whether by rules preventing newspapers from using material obtained by the paparazzi in that way or making the pursuit of people an aggravated form of dangerous driving or speeding.

Accordingly, as a matter of law, the defendant’s decision not to summon a jury was wrong and had to be quashed.