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Vicarious liability

11 March 2016
Issue: 7690 / Categories: Case law , Law digest , In Court
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Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] All ER (D) 25 (Mar)

The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, held that the respondent had been injured as a result of negligence by a prisoner in carrying on the activities assigned to him, and the prison service was, therefore, vicariously liable to her. The court considered what sort of relationship had to exist between an individual and a defendant before the defendant could be made vicariously liable in tort for the conduct of the individual, with particular regard to Various claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2013] 1 All ER 670.

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