header-logo header-logo

Wills and probate

Kostic v Chaplin & Others [2007] EWHC 2209 (Ch), [2007] All ER (D) 119 (Dec)

The deceased, B, made wills in 1971 and 1974 and a codicil in 1984 leaving his estate to his only son, Z. Those wills were apparently revoked by subsequent wills created in 1988 and 1989 in which B left his entire estate, worth £8.2m, to the Conservative Party Association (CPA). It was common ground that B had, from about the mid-1980s, suffered from a delusional disorder, believing that “dark forces” were conducting a “sinister and highly organised international conspiracy” against him in which various family members, including Z, were implicated. Part of B’s delusions involved him believing that only the Conservative Party, through the agency of Margaret Thatcher, could save the country from such dark forces.

After B’s death in October 2005, Z brought a claim alleging that the 1988 and 1989 wills were invalid because B lacked the testamentary capacity to execute them.
The claim succeeded. Applying Banks v Goodfellow (1871) LR 11 Eq 472, once an insane delusion was made out, the 1988 and 1989 wills should “be regarded with great distrust”. The presumption against the wills was “all the stronger” because they were “inofficious”; by leaving all his fortune to the CPA, B had plainly disregarded the claims of his close family members, for whom he would normally be expected to have affection. Mr Justice Henderson was left “in no real doubt” that the decision to disinherit Z “was heavily influenced by his delusions”, especially in the light of Z’s implication in the apparent conspiracy. Accordingly B lacked testamentary capacity when he made the 1988 and 1989 wills and probate was granted of the 1974 will.
Since he found that B’s decision was influenced by the delusions, the judge found it unnecessary to consider what he called the “fine distinction” between whether, for the will to be valid, it only had to be shown that the delusions did not in fact influence the dispositions in the will, or whether it also had to be shown that the delusions were not likely to influence those dispositions. That joy will have to await another occasion.
 
Costs
In relation to costs, the judge held that in contentious probate actions, the long-established exceptions to the usual costs rule had survived the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), namely: (i) that if a person who made the will, or persons who were interested in the residue had really been the cause of the litigation, or responsible for the litigation, a case was made out for costs to come out of the estate; and (ii) that if the testator and persons interested in the residue were blameless but where circumstances led reasonably to an investigation of the matter, then the costs might be left to be borne by those who had incurred them. Henderson J also identified a trend of more recent authorities to narrow rather than extend the circumstances in which the first exception is held to apply.
Issue: 7308 / Categories: Legal News , Public , Legal services , Wills & Probate
printer mail-details

MOVERS & SHAKERS

Muckle LLP—Ella Johnson

Muckle LLP—Ella Johnson

Real estate dispute resolution team welcomes newly qualified solicitor

Morr & Co—Dennis Phillips

Morr & Co—Dennis Phillips

International private client team appoints expert in Spanish law

NLJ Career Profile: Stefan Borson, McCarthy Denning

NLJ Career Profile: Stefan Borson, McCarthy Denning

Stefan Borson, football finance expert head of sport at McCarthy Denning, discusses returning to the law digging into the stories behind the scenes

NEWS
Paper cyber-incident plans are useless once ransomware strikes, argues Jack Morris of Epiq in NLJ this week
In this week's NLJ, Robert Hargreaves and Lily Johnston of York St John University examine the Employment Rights Bill 2024–25, which abolishes the two-year qualifying period for unfair-dismissal claims
Writing in NLJ this week, Manvir Kaur Grewal of Corker Binning analyses the collapse of R v Óg Ó hAnnaidh, where a terrorism charge failed because prosecutors lacked statutory consent. The case, she argues, highlights how procedural safeguards—time limits, consent requirements and institutional checks—define lawful state power
Cryptocurrency is reshaping financial remedy cases, warns Robert Webster of Maguire Family Law in NLJ this week. Digital assets—concealable, volatile and hard to trace—are fuelling suspicions of hidden wealth, yet Form E still lacks a section for crypto-disclosure
NLJ columnist Stephen Gold surveys a flurry of procedural reforms in his latest 'Civil way' column
back-to-top-scroll